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I. Introduction 
          
           The importance of the banking system for the proper functioning of the 
economy of a State and for the society as a whole is undisputed. A banking system 
functions as the heart and the lifeblood of any functioning economy. It is 
considered as the key to economic growth and development.1 There are three main 
characteristics that distinguish banks from all other classes of institutions, both 
financial and non-financial: they are offering transaction accounts, they are the 
backup source of liquidity for all other institutions and banks constitute the 
transmission belt for monetary policy.2 Their functions are so important as to 
constitute a source of public service.3 
               Despite that, in a majority of countries, only normal insolvency proceedings4 
were – and in many countries, still are - available to banks. Unfortunately 
corporate insolvency law cannot address the various issues arising from a bank 
failure such as how to limit credit and liquidity losses and the need to ensure 
continuity of systemically important financial services, because it is not designed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The role of a banking system in nation-building, John L. Douglas, Maine Law Review Vol.2, 
2008 p.512	  2	  E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks special?, in Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual 
Report 1982, 5-7 (1982), also available at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.html	  3	  In its message to Parliament recommending the adoption of the Swiss Banking Act of 1934, the 
Swiss Federal Council stated that the significant influence of those who dominate the financial 
market and grant grants is not contestable and that therefore banking had become a form of 
public service (“Der unbeschränkbare Einfluss derer, die den Geldmarkt beherrschen und den 
Kredit verteilen, ist unbestreitbar einer der grossen Machtfaktoren der Gegenwart. Bei diesen 
Verhältnissen ist die Banktätigkeit eine Art öffentlicher Dienst geworden.“), BBl 1934 I 171/ 4	  ‘Normal insolvency proceedings' mean the collective insolvency proceedings, which entail the 
partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator, normally applicable to 
institutions under national law and either specific for those institutions or generally applicable to 
any natural or legal person. Art. 2(a) EIR and Art. 2(40) RRD 	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to take into account the special nature of credit institutions5. Furthermore, bank 
insolvency may entail risk to the entire economic system not only at national level 
but also globally in case of a group of banks such as Lehman Brothers (at the time 
it collapsed the group consisted of 2.985 legal entities that operated in some 50 
countries) 6 , propagated through the insolvent bank’s counterparties. If the 
counterparty is unable to absorb the shortfall resulting from a bank’s defaulting on 
a contract (e.g., a foreign exchange contract, repurchase agreement, securities 
trading, swaps option, forward transactions, etc.) it may default on its own 
contracts with other banks.7 That could lead to further defaults, and the stability of 
the entire financial system is thereby threatened.8  
The financial crisis that began in late 2007 highlighted the shortcomings of 
the arrangements for handling the failure of large financial institutions that were in 
place on either side of the Atlantic. Large banking organizations in both the U.S. 
and Europe had become highly leveraged and complex, with numerous and 
dispersed financial operations, extensive off-balance-sheet activities, and opaque 
financial statements. These institutions were managed as single entities, despite 
their subsidiaries being structured as separate and distinct legal entities. They were 
highly interconnected through their capital markets activities, interbank lending, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Speech by Mr. Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at Sveriges 
Riksbank and ECB Conference on Bank Resolution, Stockholm, 14 November 2011. 
6 BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group (Basel: 
March 2010), p. 14 7	  The risk that the inability of one institution within a payments system, as in the financial 
markets generally, to meet its obligations when due will cause other participants or financial 
firms to be unable to meet their obligations when due is defined as systemic risk. Angell-Report 
on Netting Schemes, p. 27 
8 Insolvency – why a special regime for banks? Eva Hüpkes, Current Developments in Monetary 
and Financial Law, vol. 3 (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC), May 2002, p. 4 
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payments, and off-balance-sheet arrangements.9  
Even though the scope, scale and complexity of international financial 
transactions expanded at an unprecedented pace in the years preceding the crisis, 
the tools and techniques for handling cross-border bank crisis resolution have not 
evolved at the same pace. Some of the events during the crisis revealed gaps in 
intervention techniques and the absence in many countries of an appropriate set of 
resolution tools. Actions taken to resolve cross-border institutions during the crisis 
tended to be ad hoc, severely limited by time constraints, and to involve a 
significant amount of public support.10 So, there is a need for a separate set of rules 
applicable to the pre-insolvency and insolvency proceedings of financial 
institutions; especially if an institution is systemic and the repercussions deriving 
from its breakdown will be spread around the world. Prior to the financial crisis, 
the subject matter of the regulatory framework for the banking sector and the task 
of the relevant supervisory authorities was focused on how to prevent bank 
failures; despite the efforts, bank failures occurred and it will probably also occur 
in the future. So, it is crucial to have a legislative regime in place that it will confer 
to the authorities the power to deal both with failing banks and those on the road to 
failure.  
 In this context, in October 2010 the European Commission adopted a 
Communication11 to the European Parliament regarding the EU framework for 
crisis management in financial sector. The overriding objective of a European 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important Financial Institutions, A joint paper by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation and Bank of England. 10 December 2012, p. 2  10 	  Recommendation 10, BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank 
Resolution Group (Basel: March 2010), p. 43	  11	  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank 
on an EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector. COM (2010) 579 final	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resolution12 framework should be that ailing institutions of any type and size, and 
in particular systemically important institutions, could be allowed to fail without 
risk to financial stability whilst avoiding costs to taxpayers13. The framework will 
equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises 
pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimizing taxpayer exposure 
to losses in insolvency. At a global scale, in March 2010 the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision issued its paper Report and Recommendations of the Cross-
Border Resolution Group14 identifying the lessons learned by the crisis and making 
recommendations on how to address the relevant problems in the future. At the 
Cannes Summit, in November 2011, the G20 Leaders endorsed the Key Attributes 
of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions15 (‘the Key Attributes’) 
as the international standard for resolution regimes, following a public consultation 
process. The Key Attributes call on jurisdictions, among other things, to put in 
place an on-going recovery and resolution planning process to reduce the potential 
for failure and promote resolvability as part of the overall supervisory process. 
Such a planning process is required for all global systemically important financial 
institutions (G-SIFIs) and for any other firm assessed by national authorities as 
potentially having an impact on financial stability in the event of its failure. On this 
basis the European Commission, on 6th June 2012 adopted a proposal for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  “Resolution” means the restructuring of an institution in order to ensure the continuity of its 
essential functions, preserve financial stability and restore the viability of all or part of that 
institution. Art.2 (1) RRD 
13	  COM (2010) 579 final, p. 2	  14	  BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group (Basel: 
March 2010)	  15	  The FSB’s report Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions is 
available at:  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf.	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Resolution and Recovery Directive16 (henceforth “RRD”).  
In the first chapter (Chapter I) of this paper we will examine the core 
elements of the RRD. In Chapter II we will present what is close-out netting, we 
will assess the international recommendations that provide for a temporary stay on 
the enforcement of early termination rights and Principle 8 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles on the Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions.17  We will consider 
the legislative initiatives taken outside of the EU especially in other large financial 
centres such us the US and Switzerland, having their basis on them. Then we will 
focus on the provisions of the RRD on a regulatory stay on the enforcement. In 
Chapter III we will analyze the enforcement provisions of the Financial Collateral 
Directive18 and Chapter V of the Geneva Securities Convention19 and we will see 
the impact of the RRD (including the proposed amendment of the FCD) on them.  
II. The proposed Resolution and Recovery Directive20 	  
The RRD has the overall objective of dealing with failing institutions in a 
way that safeguards the stability of the EU financial system as a whole and 
minimize public costs and economic disruption. It takes the form of a coordination 
framework. Accordingly, national authorities will ultimately maintain their 
discretion in the most important decisions, although they will be strongly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.  
17	  Available at: http://www.unidroit.org/english/studies/study78c/main.htm	  
18  Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements, as amended by Directive 
2009/44/EC 
19 UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules on Intermediated Securities. 20	  Version of June 2012, a new version of the proposal was published on December 2013	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encouraged to try to reach joint decisions on the ways to handle bank crises in 
resolution colleges. The legal basis for the proposed Directive is article 114 
TFEU21, which allows the adoption of measures for the approximation of national 
provisions, which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. 
  Under the scope of the Directive fall all credit institutions and certain 
investment firms.22 Member States have the power to designate their resolution 
authorities, ensuring that these authorities have at their disposal adequate expertise 
and resources to manage bank resolutions at national and cross border level.23 The 
resolution authorities shall be public administrative authorities.24 A key point for 
the proper function of the new regime will be the functional separation of 
resolution activities from the other activities of any designated authority in order to 
address potential conflicts of interests, thus a supervisory authority can also be 
designated as the resolution authority as long as there is a separation between the 
supervisory function and the resolution function. In case there are two separate 
authorities, there is a need to closely cooperate in the preparation, planning and 
application of resolution decisions.25  
 All the institutions that fall under the scope of the RRD will be required to 
draw up recovery and resolution plans.26 Recovery plans will set out arrangements 
and measures so as the institution will be able to take early action and restore its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	  22	  Art. 1 RRD 
23 Art. 3 RRD	  
24 Art. 3(2) RRD and Recital 11 RRD “In order to ensure the required speed of action, to 
guarantee independence from economic actors and to avoid conflicts of interest, Member States 
should appoint public administrative authorities to perform the functions and tasks in relation to 
resolution pursuant to this Directive” 
25 Art. 3(4) RRD  26	  Arts 5 to 13 RRD	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long-term viability in the event of a material deterioration of its financial situation. 
The requirement to prepare a recovery plan should, however, be applied 
proportionately, reflecting the systemic importance of the institution or group. In 
that vein, the required content should also take into account the nature of the 
institution’s sources of funding and the degree to which group support would be 
credibly available.27  All the plans will be subject to approval by the supervisors, 
which will assess whether they are comprehensive and could feasibly restore an 
institution’s viability, in a timely manner, even in periods of financial stress.28 
Where competent authorities assess that there are deficiencies in the recovery plan 
or potential impediments to its implementation, they shall notify the institution of 
their assessment and require the institution to submit a revised plan.29 If the plan is 
still not adequate under the competent authority, the authority should be 
empowered to require that institution to take any measure necessary to redress the 
deficiencies of the plan, including making changes to its business model or to its 
funding strategy.30 That requirement may affect the freedom to conduct a business 
as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The limitation 
of that fundamental right is however necessary to meet the objectives of financial 
stability and to protect depositors and creditors. More specifically, such a 
limitation is necessary in order to strengthen the business of institutions and avoid 
that institutions grow excessively or take excessive risks without being able to 
tackle setbacks and losses and to restore their capital base. The limitation is also 
proportionate as only preventative action can ensure that adequate precautions are 
taken and therefore complies with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Recital 16 RRD and Art. 5 RRD 
28 Art. 6(1), (2) RRD	  29	  Art. 6(3) RRD	  30	  See Recital 17 and Art. 6(4) RRD	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of the European Union. Groups will be required to develop plans at both group 
level and for the individual institutions within the group.  
  Apart from recovery plans in normal time, the resolution authorities in 
cooperation with supervisors will prepare a resolution plan that will set out options 
for resolving the institution in a range of scenarios, including systemic crisis.31 
This plan will allow an institution to be resolved, minimizing taxpayer exposure to 
loss from solvency support while also protecting vital economic functions. Such 
plans should include details on the application of resolution tools and ways to 
ensure the continuity of critical functions.32 Group resolution plans will include a 
plan for the group as well as plans for each institution within the group. Resolution 
planning is an essential component of effective resolution; thus the authorities 
should have all the information necessary to achieve their goal. The requirement to 
prepare a resolution plan should, however, be simplified, reflecting the systemic 
importance of the institution or group.33  
Additionally on the basis of the resolution plan, the resolution authorities 
will assess whether an institution or group is resolvable and in case they identify 
significant impediments to the resolvability of an institution or group, they may 
require the institution or the group to take measures in order to facilitate its 
resolvability.34 Due to the potentially systemic nature of all institutions, it is 
crucial, in order to maintain financial stability that authorities have the possibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Art. 9 RRD	  32	  According to the definition of art. 2 (29) RRD as critical functions qualify those activities, 
services and operations the discontinuance of which would be likely to result in a disruption of 
the economy of, or the financial markets in, one or more Member States.  
33	  See Recital 18 RRD	  34	  Arts 14 to 16 RRD	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to resolve any institution.35 In order to achieve that objective, they will have the 
power to apply measures that might take the form of changes to legal or 
operational structures in order to ensure that critical functions can be legally and 
economically separated from other functions; drawing up service agreements to 
cover the provision of critical functions; limiting maximum individual and 
aggregate exposures; imposing reporting requirements; limiting or ceasing existing 
or proposed activities; restricting or preventing the development of new business 
lines or products; and issuing additional convertible capital instruments.  
However, the authorities discretion should be limited to what is necessary to 
simplify the structure and the operations of the institution solely to improve its 
resolvability. In a different case, it might be considered as a violation of the right to 
conduct business. Furthermore, all the measures proposed to address or remove 
impediments to the resolvability of an institution or a group should not prevent 
institutions from exercising the right of establishment conferred by the TFEU.36  In 
addition, the measures should be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on 
ground of nationality, and be justified by the overriding reason of being conducted 
in the public interest in financial stability.37 
The assessment of resolvability for groups rests upon coordination, 
consultation and joint assessment of group resolution authorities with the 
resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, other relevant competent authorities and 
the EBA.38 In the event of disagreement between national authorities on decisions 
to be taken in accordance with the RRD with regard to institutions, EBA should, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  See Recital 19 RRD	  36	  See Recital 20 RRD	  37	  See Recital 19 RRD	  38	  The European Banking Authority	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a last resort, play a role of binding mediation.39  
  The RRD also aims at overcoming current legal restrictions to the provision 
of financial support from one entity within a group to another.40 Articles 23 to 26 
expand and supplement the powers conferred to the supervisors by Article 136 
CRD41 to intervene at an early stage in cases where the financial situation or 
solvency of an institution is deteriorating. Article 27 (1) sets out the conditions 
under which the authorities shall take action and use the resolution tools; these are 
the following: (a) the competent authority or resolution authority determines that 
the institution is failing or likely to fail; (b) having regard to timing and other 
relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private 
sector or supervisory action, other than a resolution action taken in respect of the 
institution, would prevent the failure of the institution within reasonable timeframe 
and (c) a resolution action is necessary in the public interest. The intervention by 
means of resolution tools must be justified by reasons of public interest and should 
be applied only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability. In 
particular, resolution tools should be applied where the institution cannot be wound 
up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilizing the financial 
system. The measures are necessary in order to ensure the rapid transfer and 
continuation of systemically important functions and where there is no reasonable 
prospect for any alternative private solution, including any increase of capital by 
the existing shareholders or by any third party sufficient to restore the full viability 
of the institution.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  See	  Recital 13 RRD	  40	  Arts 16 to 22 RRD, also see Recital 22 RRD	  41	  Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the 
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions  
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  Article 29 sets up the general principles that should govern the resolution. 
These principles refer, inter alia, to the allocation of losses and the treatment of 
shareholders and creditors and to the consequences that the use of the tools could 
have on the management of the institution. The valuation process is described in 
article 30. According to paragraph 2, the valuation objective shall be “to assess the 
market value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is failing or is likely 
to fail so that any losses that could be derived are recognized at the moment the 
resolution tools are exercised”.  
  In the center of the Directive are the main provisions dealing with the 
resolution tools and the powers of the authorities.42 An effective resolution regime 
should minimize the costs of the resolution of a failing institution borne by the 
taxpayers. It should also ensure that large and systemic institutions could be 
resolved without jeopardizing financial stability43. In reaching that objective, the 
authorities can apply individually or in conjunction the following tools: a) sale of 
business, b) bridge institution, c) asset separation and d) bail-in.44 All Member 
States should adopt these tools in their national legislation, though it remains at the 
discretion of national authorities to retain additional specific national tools and 
powers to deal with failing institutions as long as the following conditions are met: 
a) these tools are compatible with the principles and the objectives of the RRD and 
the TFEU, b) the use of such tools and powers should not impinge on the effective 
resolution of cross-border groups, c) before these tools are used, national 
authorities are under the obligation to justify that none of the tools (singly or in 
conjunction) included in the Union framework allows them to take effective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Arts 31 to 64 RRD	  43	  See Recital 44 RRD	  44	  Art. 31(2) RRD	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resolution action and d) they should ensure that shareholders bear losses.45  
In order to apply these tools, the resolution authorities will have the power to 
take control of an institution that has failed or is about to fail the evolution of 
which will disrupt the rights of shareholders and creditors. In particular, the power 
of the authorities to transfer the shares or all or part of the assets of an institution to 
a private purchaser without the consent of shareholders affects the property rights 
of shareholders. In addition, the power to decide which liabilities to transfer out of 
a failing credit institution based upon the objectives of ensuring the continuity of 
services and avoid adverse effect on financial stability may affect the equal 
treatment of creditors46. The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors 
should be in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.47 
The resolution tools can be applied singly or in conjunction. All entail a 
degree of restructuring of the bank. Such restructuring is not a feature 
accompanying the bail-in only. The asset separation tool has to be applied in all 
circumstances in conjunction with another resolution tool.48 When applicable, the 
use of any of the resolution tools will need to be consistent with the Union State 
aid framework. In this respect, any recourse to public support and/or the use of the 
resolution funds to assist in the resolution of failing institutions will have to be 
notified to the Commission and will be assessed in accordance with the relevant 
State aid provisions in order to establish its compatibility with the internal market. 
The sale of business should enable resolution authorities to effect a sale of 
the institution or parts of its business to one or more purchasers on commercial 
terms, without requiring the consent of the shareholders or complying with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  See Recital 26 RRD	  46	  See	  Recital	  9	  RRD	  47	  See Recital 30 RRD	  48	  Art. 31(4) RRD	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procedural requirements that would otherwise apply.49 The authorities should aim 
at maximizing as far as possible the sale price. Since shareholders and creditors are 
entitled to receive no less than they would receive in normal insolvency 
proceedings, any proceeds from a partial transfer of assets should benefit the 
institution under resolution. In the event of transfer of all of the shares or of all of 
the assets, rights and liabilities of the institution, any proceeds from the transfer 
should benefit the shareholders of the failed institution. The proceeds should be 
calculated net of the costs arisen from the failure of the institution and from the 
resolution process.50 The whole procedure will not be subject to the time limits set 
out by Directive 2006/48/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions,51 moreover since the information concerning the marketing of a 
failed institution and the negotiations with potential acquirers prior to the 
application of the sale of business tool is likely to be of systemic importance and in 
order to ensure financial stability, it is important that the disclosure to the public of 
such information required by the Market Abuse Directive52 may be delayed for the 
time necessary to plan and structure the resolution of the institution in accordance 
with delays permitted under the market abuse regime. 53 
The bridge institution tool requires Member States to ensure that resolution 
authorities have the power to transfer all or part of the business of an institution to 
a publicly controlled entity54 without obtaining the consent of the shareholders of 
the institution under resolution or any third party and without complying with any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  See	  Recital 38 and art. 33 RRD	  50	  See	  Recital 39 and art. 32(3) RRD	  
51 See Recital 40 RRD 
52 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation 
53 See Recital 41 RRD 
54 Art. 34(2) RRD 
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procedural requirement under company or securities law that would otherwise 
apply.55 The bridge institution must be licensed in accordance with the Capital 
Requirements Directive and will be operated as a commercial concern within any 
limits prescribed by the State aids framework. The operations of a bridge 
institution are temporary; it shall ensure that essential financial services continue to 
be performed. It shall aim at selling the business to the private sector when market 
conditions are appropriate.56 
  The asset separation tool should enable authorities to transfer under-
performing or impaired assets to a separate vehicle. That tool should be used only 
in conjunction with other tools to prevent an undue competitive advantage for the 
failing institution risks of moral hazard.57 As it is also the case with the bridge 
institution tool, for the purpose of this tool an asset management vehicle shall be a 
legal entity that is wholly owned by one or more public authorities, which may 
include the resolution authority. 58 The assets should be transferred at market or 
long-term economic value59 so that any losses are recognized at the moment when 
the transfer takes place. In order to minimize competitive distortions and risks of 
moral hazard, this tool should only be used in conjunction with another resolution 
tool. 
  The bail-in tool confers to the resolution authorities the power to write down 
the claims of unsecured creditors of a failing institution and to convert debt claims 
to equity. It was adopted by the RRD after recommendation of the FSB as an 
additional option in conjunction with other resolution tools.60 Under the Directive, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Art. 34 (1) RRD 
56 See Recital 42 RRD 
57 See Recital 43 RRD and art. 31(4) RRD 
58 Art. 36(2) RRD 
59 In accordance with art. 30 RRD 
60 See Recital 44 RRD and Key Attributes section 3.2 (ix) 
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resolution authorities may apply these tool, and by this way also having the 
necessary flexibility to allocate losses to creditors in a range of circumstances, for 
one of the following purposes: a) to recapitalize an institution that meets the 
conditions for resolution to the extent sufficient to restore its ability to comply with 
the conditions for authorization and to carry on its activities and b) to convert to 
equity or reduce the principal amount of claims or debt instruments that are 
transferred to a bridge institution with a view to providing capital for that bridge 
institution.61  
  In the first case where the resolution authorities apply the tool, they should 
also adopt certain arrangements to ensure that a business reorganization plan for 
that institution is drawn up and implemented.62 This plan should be drawn up and 
implemented by an administrator appointed by the authorities.63 The management 
of the institution responsible for the problems should be removed. 64  The 
reorganization plan shall set out measures aimed at restoring the long-term 
viability of the institution or parts of its business within a reasonable timescale no 
longer than two years. Those measures shall be based on realistic assumptions as to 
the economic and financial market conditions under with the institution will 
operate.  The business reorganization plan shall take account, inter alia, of the 
current state and future prospects of the financial markets, reflecting best-case and 
worst-case assumptions. Stress testing shall consider a ranged of scenarios, 
including a combination of events of stress and a protracted global recession. 
Assumptions shall be compared with appropriate sector-wide benchmarks.65 If 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Recital 45 and Art. 37(2)(a)(b) RRD 62	  Art. 46(1) RRD	  63	  Art. 46(2) RRD	  64	  See Recital 46 RRD	  65	  Art. 47(2) RRD	  
Resolution of Banks and Its Impact on the Financial Collateral Directive and Chapter V of the 
Geneva Securities Convention	  	  
	   19	  
these conditions are not fulfilled the bail-in tool shall not be applied and the 
authorities can apply it only in the second case. 
  The resolution authorities should have the power to bail-in all the liabilities 
of the institution,66 so as to ensure the effectiveness of the tool and its ability to 
attain its objectives. However the Directive provides for certain exceptions since it 
is not appropriate to apply the bail-in tool to claims in so far as they are secured, 
collateralized or otherwise guaranteed. As an example for reasons of public policy 
and effective resolution, deposits that are protected under Directive 94/19/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit- guarantee 
schemes do not fall under the scope of the tool.67 Additionally where there is a 
justified necessity to ensure the critical operations of the institution and its core 
business lines or financial stability the resolution authority could exclude 
derivatives liabilities.68 Harmonized application of the possible exclusion at Union 
level would be ensured by Commission delegated acts. 
  In order to apply the bail in tool it is necessary that the resolution authorities 
can ensure that institutions would have a sufficient amount of liabilities in their 
balance sheet that could be subject to the bail in powers. The minimum amount 
will be proportionate and adapted for each category of institutions on the basis of 
their risk or the composition of its sources of funding.69 
  The RRD also establishes a detailed hierarchy of claims that complements 
and were necessary supersedes the one established in each national insolvency law. 
In principle, shareholders claims should be exhausted before those of subordinated 
creditors. It is only when those claims are exhausted that the resolution authorities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Art. 38(1) RRD	  
67 See Recitals 47, 48 and Art. 38(2)(a) RRD 68	  Art. 38(3) RRD	  69	  Art. 39 RRD	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can impose losses on senior claims.70 However, there might be circumstances when 
the resolution authorities could interfere on creditors’ rights without having 
exhausted shareholders’ claims. These circumstances are specific to the bail in tool 
and could occur when an institution under resolution might have some residual 
capital (according to the conditions for resolution an institution would be failing or 
likely to fail if it has depleted all or substantially all of its capital). In this case, the 
resolution authorities could, after having allocated the losses to the shareholders 
and reduced or cancelled most of the shareholders’ claims, convert into capital 
subordinated and, if necessary, senior liabilities. This conversion will have to take 
place in a manner that seriously dilutes the remaining shareholders’ claims. 
  In order to implement the resolution tools properly and achieve the 
resolution objectives, the authorities shall also have additional powers. They will 
be able to require any information necessary to decide upon and prepare a 
resolution action; they will exercise the rights of the shareholders of the institution 
under resolution; they will have the power to transfer shares, other instruments of 
ownership and debt instruments issued by an institution under resolution; the 
power to transfer to another person specified rights, assets or liabilities of an 
institution under resolution; the power to reduce, including to reduce to zero, the 
principal amount of or outstanding amount due in respect of eligible liabilities, of 
an institution under resolution; the power to convert eligible liabilities of an 
institution under resolution into ordinary shares or other instruments of ownership 
of that institution, a relevant parent institution or a bridge institution to which 
assets, rights or liabilities of the institution are transferred;  the power to cancel 
debt instruments issued by an institution under resolution; the power to cancel 
shares or other instruments of ownership of an institution under resolution; the 	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power to require an institution under resolution to issue new shares, or other 
instruments of ownership, or other capital instruments, including preference shares 
and contingent convertible instruments; the power to require the conversion of debt 
instruments which contain a contractual term for conversion in the circumstances 
provided for in Article 51; the power to amend or alter the maturity of debt 
instruments issued by an institution under resolution or amend the amount of 
interest payable under such instruments, including by suspending payment for a 
temporary period; the power to remove or replace the senior management of an 
institution under resolution.71  
  The resolution authorities, when they exercise their powers, will not need to 
obtain the approval or consent from any person either public or private, including 
the shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution; moreover 
procedural requirements to notify any person will not apply to them.72  
III. International Recommendations, Close-out Netting and the RRD 	  
 After presenting the key elements of the RRD, in this chapter we will focus 
on its provisions on a regulatory stay in the enforcement of early termination 
rights73 of any party under a financial contract with a failing institution. Under the 
Directive creditors and counterparties may be subject to a temporary moratorium 
and other restrictions on enforcing security and exercising contractual termination 
rights. The international recommendations and the UNIDROIT Principles on the 
Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions also promulgate this approach. 
 At first we will present what a close-out netting mechanism is, the 	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  Art. 56 (1) RRD	  72	  Art. 56(2) RRD	  73	  “Early termination rights” mean contractual acceleration, termination and other close-out 
rights	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beneficial effects that it has to market participants and how it operates. Afterwards 
we will examine what the FSB, the Basel Committee and the UNIDROIT 
proposed. Additionally we will study the legislation already in place in the USA 
and Switzerland. At the end we will analyze the relevant provisions of the RRD.  
i. Close-out netting 	  
 The close-out netting mechanism, also called default netting,74 forms a core 
part of standard market documentation, as for instance the Global Master 
Repurchase Agreement, the ISDA Master Agreement and the European Master 
Agreement.75 It is one of the most important methods used in the financial markets 
for the reduction of counterparty credit risk. Netting provisions are widely used in 
the financial market by private sector entities, in particular banks, but also private 
non-financial institutions. In the public sector, entities such as, especially, central 
banks and supranational financial institutions such as development banks make use 
of netting provisions. Close-out netting is typically applied to transactions such as 
derivatives, repurchase and securities lending agreements, and other kinds of 
transaction that tend to carry a high counterparty and/or market risk. Market 
participants have the ability to reduce their outstanding mutual obligations and the 
risks in their relations to a net exposure in relation to each of their counterparties 
that is often only a small fraction of the gross exposure. Consequently, the 
operation of close-out netting agreements reduces the risk that the inability of one 
market participant to meet its obligations creates or increases financial difficulties 
for counterparties, which could lead to a chain of failures or difficulties (contagion 
effect). Thus, netting reduces systemic risk, reduces costs for the institutions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74 UNIDROIT 2011 S78C – Doc. 2, March 2011, p. 13 
75 European Master Agreement, sections 6 and 7; ISDA Master Agreement, sections 5 and 6. 
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increases the liquidity in the market.76 Both the FSB and the Basel Committee 
strongly encourage the use of close-out netting agreements, alongside with 
collateral, because of their beneficial effects on the stability of the financial 
system. 
The mechanism comes into operation either by a declaration (“close-out”) of 
one party upon the occurrence of a pre-defined event, in particular default or 
insolvency of its counterparty (“termination event”), or it is triggered automatically 
upon the occurrence of that event (“automatic termination”). The mechanism 
extends to a bundle of financial contracts between the parties that are contractually 
included in the netting agreement.77 Upon close-out or automatic termination, all 
non-performed contracts are terminated prematurely and the value of each contract 
is determined under a pre-defined valuation mechanism contained in the standard 
documentation. The valuation process aims at a fair valuation in accordance with 
market prices, for example requiring different price quotes in established 
markets.78 The aggregate value of all contracts is then computed so as to result in 
one single payment obligation (“net amount”). This obligation remains the only 
obligation to be settled and is generally due immediately after the net amount is 
determined.  
If close-out netting occurs in the context of the insolvency of one of the 
parties and the net amount is positive for the solvent party, that party is paid from 
the insolvency estate as an unsecured creditor and may therefore lose some or all 
of its claim. Where the net amount is positive for the insolvent party, the solvent 
party must pay the insolvency estate. This means that a creditor who is in position 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 UNIDROIT 2013 C.D. (92) 6(a), April 2013, p.1  
77 UNIDROIT 2011 S78C – Doc. 2, March 2011, p. 14 78	  T. Keijser, Financial Collateral Arrangements, Kluwer 2006, p. 132	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to invoke netting is therefore in a better position than creditors who do not have 
this option. Thus we can say that netting is an exception to the pari passu or 
paritas creditorum principle in insolvency, which means that all creditors are 
treated on an equal footing.79 
ii. The FSB’s Key Attributes80  	  
  In October 2011 the FSB published the Key Attributes. Among the other 
elements important for an effective resolution regime it included specific 
recommendations concerning early termination rights. The FSB deemed that the 
incorporation into the resolution regime of such provisions would be essential for 
the achievement of the resolution objectives and for the proper implementation of 
resolution measures. It is clear that under standard market documentation for 
financial contracts and absent any statutory or regulatory provisions to the 
contrary, early termination rights in financial contracts may be triggered upon 
entry of a firm into resolution or in connection with the use of resolution powers. 
As a result large volumes of financial contracts, upon entry into resolution, could 
be terminated creating further market instability and jeopardizing the 
implementation of resolution measures aimed at achieving continuity.81 
 According to Key Attributes the entry into resolution and the exercise of any 
resolution powers should not trigger statutory or contractual set-off rights, or 
constitute an event that entitles any counterparty of the firm in resolution to 
exercise contractual acceleration or early termination rights provided the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  See Keijser, p. 290	  80	  Although the Key Attributes was published later than the BCBS’s report, we chose to present it 
first due to its importance.	  81	  Key Attributes, Annex IV 1.1	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substantive obligations under the contract continue to be performed.82 As a result 
as long as the institution under resolution meets its payment and delivery 
obligations and the provision of collateral, its counterparties are not entitled to 
enforce an early termination right. The proposal of the Key Attributes goes even 
further providing that if contractual acceleration or early termination rights are 
nevertheless exercisable, the resolution authority should have the power to stay 
temporarily such rights where they arise by reason only of entry into resolution or 
in connection with the exercise of any resolution powers.83 The underlying idea is 
that the temporary stay gives a huge advantage to the resolution authorities and at 
the same time does not affect other rights of counterparties under netting and 
collateralization agreements and do not interfere with payment or delivery 
obligations to Financial Markets Infrastructures.84 
The application of the stay shall be either automatic or on the discretion of 
the authorities which will decide on a case-by-case basis, however in both cases 
jurisdictions should ensure that the counterparties to the firm in resolution have 
clarity as to the beginning and the end of the stay.85 Besides in order to achieve its 
objective a temporary stay should be subject to certain conditions. These 
conditions, as the FSB provides, are the followings: a) the stay will only apply to 
early termination rights that arise for reasons only of entry into resolution or in 
connection with the use of resolution powers; to illustrate, if the resolution 
authorities exercise their power to change the management of the falling institution 
and to appoint an administrator, this event would not qualify as an enforcement 
event, which is the reality in many jurisdictions; b) the stay is strictly limited in 	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  See id. 4.2	  83	  See id. 4.3 and Annex IV 1.2	  84	  See id. Annex IV 1.3	  85	  See id. 4.3 and Annex IV 2.2	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time, it only confers  the authorities the necessary time to act and for this reason it 
shall not exceed two business days; c) the resolution authority would only be 
permitted to transfer all of the eligible contracts with a particular counterparty to a 
new entity and would not be permitted to select for transfer individual contracts 
with the same counterparty and subject to the same netting agreement (“no cherry-
picking” rule); d) for contracts that are transferred to a third party or bridge 
institution, the acquiring entity would assume all the rights and obligations of the 
firm from which the contracts were transferred; e)  the early termination rights of 
the counterparty are preserved against the firm in resolution in the case of any 
default occurring before, during or after the period of the stay that is not related to 
entry into resolution or the exercise of a resolution power (for example, a failure to 
make a payment or the failure to deliver or return collateral on a due date); 
f) following a transfer of financial contracts the early termination rights of the 
counterparty are preserved against the acquiring entity in the case of any 
subsequent independent default by the acquiring entity; g) the counterparty can 
exercise the right to close out immediately against the firm in resolution on expiry 
of the stay or earlier if the authorities inform the firm that the relevant contracts 
will not be transferred; and h) after the period of the stay, early termination rights 
could be exercised for those financial contracts that are not transferred to a sound 
firm, bridge institution or other public entity.86 
In any case as part of the resolution planning process and resolvability 
assessments, authorities should consider the implications of a temporary stay on 
the exercise of early termination rights for FMIs and other counterparties of the 
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  See id. 4.3 and Annex IV 2.1	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firm.87 
iii. BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank 
Resolution Group 	  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published its own 
recommendations regarding the resolution of cross-border banking institutions. In 
the same way as the FSB, the BCBS promotes the introduction of regulatory 
powers to transfer assets from a failing institution to a bridge institution and the 
possibility of regulatory moratoria on netting, alongside with a number of 
safeguards protecting the enforceability of close-out netting provisions. The 
GBRG Report recommends that national resolution authorities should have the 
power to temporarily delay immediate operation of contractual early termination 
clauses in order to complete a transfer of certain financial market contracts to 
another sound financial institution, a bridge financial institution or other public 
entity.88  
 According to the report, such provisions would benefit both market 
participants and the failing institution’s counterparties. The temporary stay on the 
enforcement of early terminations rights promotes the continuity of market actions 
without endangering the safe and orderly operations of FMIs. Besides while the 
current protections for financial contracts and the operation of close-out netting 
brings advantages and reduces the risk of contagion during normal markets, the 
crisis has shown us that in times of pressure on the financial markets, it may also 
carry significant disadvantages. As a result, if all counterparties of a failing bank 
exercise the right to terminate immediately financial contracts and liquidate 
collateral upon the initiation of resolution measures, it will undermine financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  See id. Annex IV 2.3	  88	  Basel Committee CBRG Report, Recommendation 9, p. 42	  
Resolution of Banks and Its Impact on the Financial Collateral Directive and Chapter V of the 
Geneva Securities Convention	  	  
	   28	  
stability. The closing out of large volumes of financial contracts could destabilize 
markets and undermine orderly resolutions of failing institutions. Counterparties 
may be required to use the asset values determined in the closing out of financial 
contracts to establish market prices for similar assets subject to contracts with third 
parties. This “fire sale” valuation will transmit the debtor’s instability far beyond 
its counterparties. In these circumstances, transferring the debtor’s financial 
contracts to a solvent third party, a bridge bank or another public entity would 
better protect financial stability. Thus, it is in interest of all the market participants 
to have the resolution authorities such powers.89 
 However we should try to achieve balance between the powers of the 
authorities to impose a temporary stay on the enforcement and reliable close-out 
netting agreements. In order to safeguard the reliability and availability of netting 
agreements the report suggests that the period of time during which the authorities 
can delay immediate operation of contractual early termination rights pending a 
transfer should be clearly defined and limited, after which full termination and 
close-out rights would be available for all financial contracts not transferred to a 
solvent transferee. The contracts should be transferred a new sound counterparty 
(for example, a creditworthy private sector purchaser, a government-owned bridge 
bank or another public entity) as a whole or not at all with no options for selecting 
out individual contracts with the same counterparty (cherry-picking). The early 
termination rights are preserved as against the transferee in relation to any 
subsequent default by the transferee. The early termination rights and netting rights 
are preserved for contracts that are not transferred to a new counterparty prior to 
expiration of the brief delay period. The regulatory powers should be designed in 
such a way as to preserve the safe and orderly operation of netting arrangements 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  See id. (115) 	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used by central market infrastructures, such as clearing systems. Furthermore 
cross-jurisdictional inconsistencies in respect of netting must not render bank 
resolution ineffective.90 
 The BCBS also recommended that within EU the FCD should be amended 
and in other jurisdictions their relative legislation so as to permit a short delay in 
immediate close-out. In addition, national and international authorities should 
explore through statutory amendments or through private sector review of market 
documentation the means to fairly facilitate the ability of a defaulting counterparty 
or its estate to realize the benefit of "in-the-money" derivatives contracts. The 
authorities should encourage industry groups, such as ISDA91, to explore a way to 
deal with the issue in a master agreement that support such transfers as a way to 
reduce the risk of contagion in a crisis. So they could include incorporating 
conditions that contracts are not automatically terminated due to government 
intervention or due to a change in control so long as compliance with the contract 
is maintained. 
iv. Principle 8 of the UNIDROIT Principles on the Operation of Close-out 
Netting Provisions 	  
 Principle 8: “These Principles are without prejudice to a stay or any other 
measure which the law of the implementing State, subject to appropriate 
safeguards, may provide for in the context of resolution regimes for financial 
institutions.” 
This principle introduces an exception to the enforceability of the netting 
agreements and is in line with the Key Attributes. It aims at assisting national 
legislators to shape legal rules on close-out netting that also accommodate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  See id. (118)	  91	  International Swaps and Derivatives Association	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resolution regimes for financial institutions.92 It intends to cover two crucial 
aspects. The first is that the legal framework governing close-out netting 
should be clear and transparent and that close-out netting should be 
enforceable also within the context of resolution regimes for financial 
institutions. The second aspect is that despite the above, close-out netting 
should not hamper the effective implementation of resolution measures. In 
particular, the competent authority should, under certain conditions and to a 
certain extent, have the right to delay the operation of a close-out netting provision 
by means of a stay of the termination or acceleration rights occurring under such 
provision.  
This exception covers all the resolution powers of the national authorities 
and it is not limited to their power to impose a stay in the enforcement of the close-
out netting. However “appropriate safeguards” must be in place to protect the 
interests of the counterparty of the failing institution and at the same time ensuring 
the effective resolution.  The reference to ‘appropriate safeguards’ in Principle 8 is 
to be understood as subjecting the exception contemplated in this Principle to 
international standards on the appropriate treatment of close-out netting in the 
context of resolution regimes for financial institutions. Thus, Principle 8 is oriented 
at and should be interpreted in the light of the Key Attributes parts 4 and 5 as 
explained above.93 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  UNIDROIT Principles on the Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions, p. 63 
93 See id. p. 65 
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v. The legislation in the US and Switzerland 
i. US 
In the US under the “Dodd-Frank Act”94 the competent authority has the 
power to enforce or repudiate certain qualified financial contracts within a 
reasonable period of time. It also has the power to transfer to a financial institution 
(defined to include a bridge bank) all the qualified financial contracts (including 
related collateral or other credit enhancement) between the bank and a counterparty 
and such counterparty’s affiliates. The authority has until 5 PM eastern time on the 
business day after appointment as receiver to notify such persons of the transfer of 
such contracts. Such persons have no right to terminate or close-out and net such 
contracts until 5 PM on that following business day.95 Thereafter, full close-out and 
netting rights are available in respect of qualified financial contracts left behind in 
the receivership, but are not available for contracts transferred to a healthy 
financial institution or bridge bank. In the case of either repudiation or transfer, the 
authority must repudiate or transfer all or none of the qualified financial contracts 
between the insured bank and a counterparty and that counterparty’s affiliate.96 
ii. Switzerland 	  
 Switzerland was one of the first countries that implemented the Key 
Attributes through its Banking Insolvency Ordinance. 97  The ordinance is 
compatible with the RRD. It provides that if financial contracts are transferred in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  The “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” of 21 July 2010	  95	  Section 210(c)(10)(B) Dodd-Frank Act. 
96 Section 210(c)(1) and 210(c)(11) Dodd-Frank Act 
97 Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority on the Insolvency of Banks 
and Securities Dealers (Banking Insolvency Ordinance, BIO-FINMA) of 30 August 2012  
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full or in part to another legal entity during the transfer of banking services, 
FINMA 98 , as the resolution authority, has the power to put a stay on the 
termination of contracts.99 The stay may only be ordered for financial contracts 
whose termination or right of termination are linked to the restructuring measures 
or protective measures ordered by the authorities.100 A stay may only be imposed 
for a maximum of 48 hours.101 FINMA shall expressly specify the start and end of 
the stay. However the stay does not apply if: the conduct of the bank involved in 
the restructuring proceedings either before, during or after the stay provides a 
different cause for termination or right of termination; the conduct of the legal 
entity which takes over the financial contracts in full or in part, following the 
transfer, provides a different cause independent of the transfer for the termination 
or right of termination. 102  The counterparty of the bank involved in the 
restructuring proceedings may exercise the right vis-à-vis the bank to terminate the 
contract: immediately after the stay has expired and as soon as he or she has been 
informed that his/her financial contract was not transferred.103  
vi. The RRD  	  
 In its Communication of October 2010 the Commission took the position 
that “the framework should include provision for a temporary stay on rights to 
close out netting where authorities transfer relevant contracts as part of a resolution 
measure, and will consult with experts on the details of such a provision.” “In 
addition, the framework will also include safeguards for counterparties and market 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority	  
99 Art. 57(1) BIO-FINMA 
100 Art. 57(2) BIO-FINMA 
101 Art. 57(3) BIO-FINMA 
102 Art. 57(4) BIO-FINMA 
103 Art. 57(5) BIO-FINMA	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arrangements that may be affected by a transfer of property, assets or liabilities, 
together with provisions on judicial review to ensure that affected parties have 
appropriate rights to challenge the actions of authorities and seek financial redress, 
without undermining the legal certainty of the action.” 
 The framework provides for a temporary stay so as to give the resolution 
authority the necessary time to put into practice the resolution tools. 104 The 
authorities must have a true picture of the balance sheet of the failing institution, 
without changes in value and scope that extensive exercise of termination rights 
would entail. During the stay they will identify contracts that needs to be 
transferred to a private sector purchaser or bridge institution. Though in order to 
safeguard the contractual rights of counterparties and to interfere with them to the 
minimum extent necessary the restriction on termination rights should apply only 
in relation to the resolution action, and rights to terminate arising from any other 
default, including failure to pay or deliver margin, should remain. 105 
 According to the Directive, the resolution authorities shall have the power to 
suspend the termination rights of any party under a financial contract with a failing 
institution, as long as, the sole reason is an action by the authorities. During the 
stay the authorities shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that all margin, 
collateral and settlement obligations of the failing institution that arise under 
financial contracts during the period of suspension are met.106 The suspension 
should be limited in time and it will last from the time of the notification until no 
later than 5 pm (local time of the Member State where the institution under 
resolution is) on the business day following that notification.107 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  See Recital 58 RRD	  105	  See Recital 59 RRD	  106	  Art. 63(2) RRD	  107	  Art. 63(1) RRD	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 The stay does not apply to the counterparties that are notified by the 
authorities that their contracts covered by the netting arrangement will not be 
transferred to another entity. 108  At the end of the suspension period early 
termination rights are available for the parties, whose contracts with the failing 
institution remained with it and the authorities did not exercised the bail-in tool 
that would have made the institution viable.109 Moreover in case that the contracts 
have been transferred to another entity or the bail-in tool has been applied to the 
institution under resolution, the counterparty has the right to terminate the contract 
on the occurrence of any subsequent default of the other entity or of the institution 
to which the bail-in tool has been applied.110 However the counterparty has no right 
to terminate the contracts for the reason only of the transfer to a new entity or 
because of the application of the bail-in tool.111 
 Under the scope of the RRD fall the following contracts and agreements: a) 
securities contracts, including i) contracts for the purchase, sale or loan of a 
security, a group or index of securities, ii) an option on a security or group or index 
of securities, iii) a repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction on any such 
security, group or index; b) commodities contracts, including: i) contracts for the 
purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery, ii) an option on a commodity; 
c) futures and forwards contracts, including contracts (other than a commodities 
contract) for the purchase, sale or transfer of a commodity or property of any other 
description, service, right or interest for a specified price at a future date, d) 
repurchase agreements relating to securities; e) swap agreements, including: i) 
swaps, options, futures or forward agreements relating to interest rates; spot or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Art. 63(3) RRD	  109	  Art. 63(4)(b) RRD	  110	  Art. 63(4)(a)(ii) RRD	  111	  Art. 63(4)(a)(i) RRD	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other foreign exchange, precious metals or commodity agreements; currency; an 
equity index or equity; a debt index or debt; commodity indexes or commodities; 
weather; emissions or inflation, ii) total return, credit spread or credit swaps, iii) f) 
any agreement or transaction that is similar to an agreement referred to in points (i) 
or (ii) of this point which is the subject of recurrent dealing in the swaps or 
derivatives markets; (f) Master agreements for any of the contracts or agreements 
referred to in point (a) to (e). 112 
 Article 77 RRD provides that the Member States shall ensure that 
counterparties under a financial contract entered into originally with the institution 
under resolution cannot exercise termination rights under that contract or rights 
under a walk-away clause unless the resolution action is the sale of business tool or 
the bridge institution tool and the rights and liabilities covered by the financial 
contract are not transferred to a third party or bridge institution, as the case may be. 
 Regarding the enforcement of security interests, resolution authorities will 
have the power to restrict secured creditors of an institution under resolution from 
enforcing security interests in relation to any assets of that institution for a limited 
period that the authority determines necessary to achieve the resolution 
objectives.113 However the time period of the restriction is not specified by the 
Directive, but Commission will adopt on a later stage delegated acts that will 
specify both the time period and the classes of security interests that will be subject 
to the restriction.114  In any case central counterparties should not be affected by 
it.115 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Art. 63(6) RRD	  113	  Art. 62(1) RRD	  114	  Art. 62(4) RRD	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  Art. 62(2) RRD	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IV. The Financial Collateral Directive and Chapter V of the Geneva Securities 
Convention 	  
 In this chapter we will examine the enforcement provisions of the FCD and 
Chapter V of the GSC and we will assess the impact of the RRD on them. 
i. The enforcement provisions of the FCD 	  
 The EU Financial Collateral Directive follows a “substantive law” 
approach, according to which Member States shall ensure that a close-out netting 
provision can take effect in accordance with its terms: (a) notwithstanding the 
commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings or reorganization 
measures in respect of the collateral provider and/or the collateral taker; and/or (b) 
notwithstanding any purported assignment, judicial or other attachment or other 
disposition of or in respect of such rights.116 Additionally, the operation of a close-
out netting provision may not be subject to formal requirements in the sense of art. 
4(4) FCD,117 which determines that a) prior notice of the intention to realize must 
have been given; b) the terms of the realization be approved by any court, public 
officer or other person; (c) the realization be conducted by public auction or in any 
other prescribed manner; or (d) any additional time period must have elapsed. The 
parties have the freedom to choose otherwise. 
Recital 14 explains the objective behind the liberal close-out netting regime 
of art. 7 FCD. It makes clear that close-out netting as a risk management tool 
enables market participants to express the risk in respect of a counterparty on a net 
basis. The FCD protects the enforceability of close-out netting and it is therefore 
favorable to the creditor who can invoke netting under a financial collateral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Art. 7(1) FCD	  117	  Art. 7(2) FCD	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arrangement. However the FCD does not offer certainty in all respects, as national 
law plays an important role when determining if and under what conditions close-
out netting can take effect. Due to the fact that close-out netting confers to the 
creditor who can invoke it a huge advantage, but at the same time also results in 
the disappearance of assets to which this creditor’s counterparty is entitled and 
ultimately all other creditors of that counterparty, national law restrictions come 
into play to determine how the interests of different groups of creditors are taken 
into account.118 
This continuing role of national law follows from recital 15 of the FCD.  
The recital states in general terms that restrictions or requirements under national 
law relating to set off (or netting) should be taken into account. By a way of an 
example this recital makes clear that it should be determined under national law 
whether claims are reciprocal and are thus eligible for set-off. Another issue that 
should, according to the recital, be considered under national law is whether set-off 
can take place in light of the knowledge about his counterparty’s insolvency 
possessed by the party invoking set off.119 In addition, FCD is also silent on some 
topics and for this reason they should be determined under national law. An 
important example is the moment in time at which the claims of the parties who are 
subject to close-out netting should be valued.120 
Concerning the enforcement of security interests, under art. 4 of the FCD a 
pledgee is able to choose between a sale and, if this has been agreed upon, 
appropriation.121 In the case of a sale of securities, FCD envisages a liberal 
enforcement regime, allowing every method of sale upon which collateral provider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See Keijser, p. 293, 119	  See id. p. 292	  120	  See id. p. 293	  121	  Art. 4(1)(2) FCD	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and collateral taker agree and prohibiting formal requirements such as prior notice, 
approval by a judge, public auction and time restrictions.122 
The rationale behind this approach is that formal requirements usually 
prevent immediate enforcement. By ensuring rapid enforcement the FCD intends 
to promote the continued liquidity of the financial markets. By allowing direct 
enforcement, contagion effects on the counterparties of defaulting market 
participant are limited and this means a reduction of systemic risk.123 
ii. Chapter V of the Geneva Securities Convention 	  
Chapter V of the Convention contains several special provisions relating to 
collateral transactions. It applies to transactions where a “collateral provider”124 
provides “collateral securities” 125  to a “collateral taker” 126  to secure the 
performance of the “relevant obligations”.127 
The provision of the collateral is may be provided pursuant to a “security 
collateral agreement”128 under which the collateral taker receives a “grant of an 
interest other than full ownership” in the collateral securities. Alternatively, the 
collateral provider may provide the collateral pursuant to a  “title transfer collateral 
arrangement”129 under which the collateral taker receives “full ownership” of the 
collateral securities. 
It is important to note that Chapter V is “optional” in several respects. The 
reason for this is that this chapter touches upon important public policy issues, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  See Keijser, p. 283 and Art. 4(4) FCD	  123	  See Keijser, p. 284	  
124 Art. 31(3)(g) GSC defining “collateral provider” 125	  Art. 31(3)(e) GSC defining “collateral securities”	  126	  Art. 31(3)(f) GSC defining “collateral taker”	  127	  Art. 31(3)(d) GSC defining “relevant obligations”	  128	  Art. 31(3)(b) GSC defining “security collateral agreement”	  129	  Art. 31(3)(c) GSC defining “title transfer collateral agreement”	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notably consumer protection and insolvency.130 The Contracting States may declare 
that it does not apply at all131 or certain categories of parties will not fall under its 
scope or they can define which collateral agreements it will cover and it will not 
apply to intermediated securities that are not permitted to be traded on an exchange 
or regulated market.132 
Article 33 permits a collateral taker to exercise remedies by realizing on 
collateral securities or by operating a “close-out netting provision”.133  These 
remedies are triggered by the occurrence of an “enforcement event”134 and are 
available “notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of an insolvency 
proceeding in respect of the collateral provider or the collateral taker”.135 The 
purpose of this article is, on the one hand, to specify the rights of the collateral 
taker on the occurrence of an enforcement event and, on the other hand, to 
eliminate obstacles to enforcement that might arise under national legislation, 
particularly with regard to insolvency proceedings.136 
Article 33(1)(a) GSC sets out the rights that the collateral taker may exercise 
with regard to the collateral securities when an enforcement event occurs. The 
collateral taker can sell the collateral securities (realization in the strict sense) or 
appropriate them. As regards the first option of sale the collateral taker will be paid 
by applying the net proceeds of sale in or towards the discharge of the relevant 
obligations. Where the amount of the net proceeds of the sale is higher than the 
amount of the secured debt, the difference would have to be repaid to the collateral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Official Commentary on the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated 
Securities, Oxford University Press 2012, p.217	  131	  Art. 38(1) GSC	  132	  Art. 38(2) GSC	  133	  Arts 33(1); 31(3)(j) GSC defining “close-out netting provision”	  134	  Arts 33(1); 31(3)(h) GSC defining “enforcement event”	  135	  Art. 33(3)(b) GSC	  136	  See Official Commentary, p. 198, section 33-10	  
Resolution of Banks and Its Impact on the Financial Collateral Directive and Chapter V of the 
Geneva Securities Convention	  	  
	   40	  
provider.137 The second option available to the collateral taker is the appropriation 
of the collateral securities. However appropriation is permitted only with the 
consent of the parties and only if they have specified the basis on which the 
collateral securities are to be valued. 
 Article 33(1)(b) GSC is a general provision stating that a close-out netting 
provision, as defined by the Convention, may be operated on the occurrence of an 
enforcement event. Paragraph 2 deals with the case where an enforcement event 
occurs before the collateral taker has performed its obligation to transfer equivalent 
collateral under the terms of the collateral agreement. This provision refers to two 
scenarios. The first scenario is close-out netting that is the intrinsic and popular 
manner of enforcing a title transfer collateral agreement. The second scenario 
concerns situations where, in a security collateral agreement, the collateral taker 
has the right to use the collateral on the condition that it returns equivalent 
collateral at the latest by the time the secured obligation is discharged. Also in this 
case paragraph 2 allows for a close-out netting provision to be triggered.138 
 Paragraph 3 tries to overcome the obstacles to the realization of the 
collateral, which traditionally exist in some jurisdictions. It covers also the 
operation of close-out netting provisions. According to it the collateral taker, 
unless they have agreed on different terms, may realize the collateral, in 
accordance with the methods described above, without prior notification to its 
counterparty, without court approval, or approval by a public officer or other 
person, and without the requirement that the realization be conducted by public 
auction or in any other prescribed manner.139 In addition under para 3(b) the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See id. p. 199, section 33-13 138	  See id. p. 200, section 33-18 	  139	  Art. 33(3)(a)(i-iii) GSC	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opening of insolvency proceedings that affect the collateral provider or the 
collateral taker does not influence the realization as well as the implementation of a 
close-out netting provision. 
iii. What would be the impact of the RRD on them?  	  
 Article 107 RRD amends the Financial Collateral Directive by adding to 
article 7 of the FCD a new paragraph 1a stating that: "1a. Paragraph 1 does not 
apply to any restriction on the effect of a close out netting provision that is 
imposed by virtue of Article 77 of Directive XX/XX/EU or by the exercise by the 
resolution authority of the power to impose a temporary stay in accordance with 
Article 63 of that Directive.” 
 This new paragraph changes the approach of the FCD, as we have examined 
it. The close-out netting mechanism will not be operational under all the 
circumstances as it was before. Market participants will have to adapt to the new 
environment, where certain events that would normally qualify as enforcement 
events, will not trigger the operation of the close-out netting provisions. The liberal 
regime established by the FCD is restricted. On the other hand the RRD does not 
change the FCD in any other way retaining all the protections available for the 
close-out netting provisions. 
 With regard to the GSC, the RRD does not affect it directly since the 
Convention is an international agreement. However when the RRD will be enacted 
none of the EU Member States would be able to ratify the GSC. The convention 
should be amended so as to reflect the new global approach.  
V. Conclusions 	  
 After the financial crisis we have witnessed a “regulatory tsunami”, a great 
Resolution of Banks and Its Impact on the Financial Collateral Directive and Chapter V of the 
Geneva Securities Convention	  	  
	   42	  
number of event legislation has been adopted in order to safeguard the financial 
system. The proposed RRD forms part of this legislation, aiming at creating a clear 
framework for the resolution and recovery of banks and other financial institutions. 
Its provisions would affect all the market participants, who will have to adopt the 
way they conducted their business and they concluded their financial contracts. 
The industry should include in its standard documentation that the intervention of 
the resolution authorities to the failing institution should not be considered as an 
enforcement event and thus triggering the application of close-out netting 
mechanism.  
 The RRD follows the predominant approach, which is developed after the 
crisis, around the world and considers the stay on the enforcement of early 
termination rights as beneficial to the stability of the system.  However we should 
bear in mind that the effects of crisis have not passed yet and this period we should 
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